Consciousness from cognitive point of view

The lecture takes place on the Microsoft teams platform in synchronous meetings.

https://teams.microsoft.com/l/channel/19%3a60e5cea05db34e6db88cb3b7d8a89938%40thread.tacv2/Og%25C3%25B3lny?groupId=ee5b3b66-99a1-4aed-bd37-b30435b1e827&tenantId=e80a627f-ef94-4aa9-82d6-c7ec9cfca324

During the lecture the main question of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science will be discussed. What is consciousness? What role does it play in human cognition? The special part of this discussion concerns the fact, that consciousness should be studied in its aspects: as selective consciousness, sub-consciousness, self-consciousness and as mental activity of a subject. I will speak of, among others, about Consciousness as subjects of the interdisciplinary field of research, The role of concepts and language and alternate states of consciousness like out of body experience or lucid dreams.

The first meeting starts on 14 October

Everyone who has this code xbc70io can participate.

Scientific Essay

During the lecture will be discussed the main question of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Bermudez, J.L., 2001, Nonconceptual self-consciousness and cognitive science, Synthese 129: 129–149, Kluver.

Block, N., 1995, On a confusion about a function of consciousness, Behavioural and Brain Science 18 (2), 1995, s. 227-287.

Boghossian, P.A., 2003, Content and Self-Knowledge, [w:] Privileged Access. Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, red. B., Gertler, Ashgate.

Brentano, F., 1999, Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia, (tłum.) W. Galewicz, Warszawa, PWN.

Burge, T., 1988, Individualism and Self-Knowledge, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 85, s. 649-663.

Chrudzimski, A., 1999, Semantyka uprzywilejowanego dostępu, Filozofia Nauki, nr 3-4 (27-28), s. 85-102.

Davidson, D., 1984, First Person Authority, Dialectica 38, s. 101-111.

Dennett, D.C., 1997, Natura umysłów, tłum. W. Turopolski, Warszawa, CIS.

Evans, G., 1982, The Variety of Reference, ed. J. McDowell, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Fodor, J.A., 1998, Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong?, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Frank, M., 2002, Świadomość siebie i poznanie siebie, (tłum.) Z. Zwoliński, Warszawa, Oficyna Naukowa

Gallagher, S., 2003, Bodily self-awarness and the object perception. Theoria et Historia Scientarum (red.) T. Komendziński, , vol. VII, Nr 1., Wydawnictwo UMK.

Goldberg, S.C., 1999, The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge, Synthese 118, Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publisher, s. 165-199.

Metzinger, T., 2004, Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge, Massachusstts, London, MIT.

Millikan, R. G., 1986. Thoughts Without Laws; Cognitive Science with Content, The Philosophical Review, XCV, No. 1 (January 1986), s. 47-80-

Millikan, R.G., 1991, Perceptual Content and Fregean Myth, Mind, vol. C.4.. October.

Millikan, R.G. 2000, On Clear and Confused Ideas. An Essay about Substance Concepts, Cambridge, University Press.

Peacocke, Ch., 1998, Nonconceptual Content Defended, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LVIII, No. 2, June 1998.

Peacocke, Ch., 1998, Jak są możliwe prawdy aprioryczne? (tłum.) T. Szubka, [w:] T. Szubka, P. Gutowski, Filozofia brytyjska u schyłku XX wieku, Lublin, TN KUL.

Peacocke, Ch., 2006, Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I), [w:] Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, red. J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin,Blackwell, http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2161/Online_Papers/

Peacocke, Ch., 2008, Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II): Epistemology, [w:] Mental Action, ed. L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou, Oxford University Press. http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2161/Online_Papers/

Piłat, R., 1999, Umysł jako model świata, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Piłat, R., Pojęcie samego siebie, artykuł niepublikowany.

Schildknecht, Ch., 2000, Sense and the Self. Perspectives on Nonpropositionality, Paderborn, Mentis.

Searle, J., 1999, Umysł, mózg i nauka, [w:] Z. Chlewiński, Umysł. Dynamiczna organizacja pojęć, Warszawa, PWN.

Shoemaker, S., 1994, Self-Knowledge and „Inner Sense”. Lecture I: The Object Perception Model, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, No.2, June, s. 249-269.

Shoemaker, S., 1994, Self-Knowledge and „Inner Sense”. Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, No.2, June, s. 271-290.

Shoemaker, S., 1994, Self-Knowledge and „Inner Sense”. Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, No.2, June, s. 291-314.

Szubka, T., 1998, Eksternalizm w filozofii umysłu i jego konsekwencje, Ruch Filozoficzny, Tom LV, Nr 3, s. 471-477.

Twardowski, K., 1965, O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju, [w:] Wybrane Pisma Filozoficzne, Warszawa, PWN.

Ziemińska, R. 2002, Eksternalizm we współczesnej epistemologii, Szczecin, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego

Żegleń, U.M., 2002, Świadomość a problem redukcji, Roczniki Filozoficzne, t. L (2002), z. 1, s. 597-616.

During the lecture will be discussed the main question of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Bermudez, J.L., 2001, Nonconceptual self-consciousness and cognitive science, Synthese 129: 129–149, Kluver.

Block, N., 1995, On a confusion about a function of consciousness, Behavioural and Brain Science 18 (2), 1995, s. 227-287.

Boghossian, P.A., 2003, Content and Self-Knowledge, [w:] Privileged Access. Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, red. B., Gertler, Ashgate.

Burge, T., 1988, Individualism and Self-Knowledge, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 85, s. 649-663.

Davidson, D., 1984, First Person Authority, Dialectica 38, s. 101-111.

Evans, G., 1982, The Variety of Reference, ed. J. McDowell, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Fodor, J.A., 1998, Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong?, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Gallagher, S., 2003, Bodily self-awarness and the object perception. Theoria et Historia Scientarum (red.) T. Komendziński, , vol. VII, Nr 1., Wydawnictwo UMK.

Goldberg, S.C., 1999, The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge, Synthese 118, Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publisher, s. 165-199.

Metzinger, T., 2004, Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge, Massachusstts, London, MIT.

Millikan, R. G., 1986. Thoughts Without Laws; Cognitive Science with Content, The Philosophical Review, XCV, No. 1 (January 1986), s. 47-80-

Millikan, R.G., 1991, Perceptual Content and Fregean Myth, Mind, vol. C.4.. October.

Millikan, R.G. 2000, On Clear and Confused Ideas. An Essay about Substance Concepts, Cambridge, University Press.

Peacocke, Ch., 1998, Nonconceptual Content Defended, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LVIII, No. 2, June 1998.

Peacocke, Ch., 2006, Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I), [w:] Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, red. J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin,Blackwell, http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2161/Online_Papers/

Peacocke, Ch., 2008, Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II): Epistemology, [w:] Mental Action, ed. L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou, Oxford University Press. http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2161/Online_Papers/

Schildknecht, Ch., 2000, Sense and the Self. Perspectives on Nonpropositionality, Paderborn, Mentis.

Shoemaker, S., 1994, Self-Knowledge and „Inner Sense”. Lecture I: The Object Perception Model, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, No.2, June, s. 249-269.

Shoemaker, S., 1994, Self-Knowledge and „Inner Sense”. Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, No.2, June, s. 271-290.

Shoemaker, S., 1994, Self-Knowledge and „Inner Sense”. Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, No.2, June, s. 291-314.

The lecture takes place on the Microsoft teams platform in synchronous meetings.

https://teams.microsoft.com/l/channel/19%3a60e5cea05db34e6db88cb3b7d8a89938%40thread.tacv2/Og%25C3%25B3lny?groupId=ee5b3b66-99a1-4aed-bd37-b30435b1e827&tenantId=e80a627f-ef94-4aa9-82d6-c7ec9cfca324

During the lecture the main question of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science will be discussed. What is consciousness? What role does it play in human cognition? The special part of this discussion concerns the fact, that consciousness should be studied in its aspects: as selective consciousness, sub-consciousness, self-consciousness and as mental activity of a subject. I will speak of, among others, about Consciousness as subjects of the interdisciplinary field of research, The role of concepts and language and alternate states of consciousness like out of body experience or lucid dreams.

The first meeting starts on 14 October

Everyone who has this code xbc70io can participate.

No