Consciousness from cognitive point of view [2401-OG-EN-CFCP] Semestr zimowy 2018/19
Wykład, grupa nr 1

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Consciousness from cognitive point of view: Schedule

1. The philosophical outline of the problem.

2. Consciousness as subjects of psychology

3. Some empirical findings.

4. Consciousness as subjects of the interdisciplinary field of research.

5. Theories of consciousness.

6. Back to philosophy: The problem of Intentionality

7. The role of concepts and language (1.)

8. Dreams, hypnosis, OBE

9. Consciousness and free will

10. From self-consciousness to self-knowledge

11. Empirical findings once again.

12. The power of consciousness?

13. Who is conscious?

14. Applications of the theories of consciousness

15. Summary

Lecture

power point presentation

conversatory lecture

Assessment methods:

1. Scoring for moderating a discussion – 15%

2. Active participation in the discussion – 15%

3. Scientific essay – 40%

4. Digital presentation – 30%

Assessment criteria:

fail- (0-49%)

satisfactory- (50-59%)

satisfactory plus- (60-69%)

good - (70-79%)

good plus- (80-89%)

very good- (90-100%)